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A Neglected Response to the Paradoxes of Confirmation  
 
ABSTRACT. Hempel‘s paradox of the ravens, and his take on it, are meant to be understood as 
being restricted to situations where we have no additional background information. According to 
him, in the absence of any such information, observations of FGs confirm the hypothesis that all 
Fs are G. In this paper I argue against this principle by way of considering two other paradoxes of 
confirmation, Goodman‘s ‗grue‘ paradox and the ‗tacking‘ (or ‗irrelevant conjunct‘) paradox. 
What these paradoxes reveal, I argue, is that a presumption of causal realism is required to ground 
any confirmation; but once we grant causal realism, we have no reason to accept the central 
principles giving rise to the paradoxes.  
Hempel’s paradox of the ravens 
Here‘s an initial—though, as we shall see, simplistic—outline of Hempel‘s (1945) paradox of 
the ravens. The paradox involves two compelling principles, SUPPORT and 
EQUIVALENCE, and two hypotheses, [Rave] and [NoB], which are logically equivalent: 
 
 SUPPORT 
 A generalization is confirmed (supported) by observations of its instances—
so long as no counterinstances have been observed. (I.e. observations of 
FGs confirm the hypothesis ‗All Fs are G‘, so long as no Fs that are not G 
have been observed.) 
 
EQUIVALENCE 
Evidence that confirms a hypothesis equally confirms any logically 
equivalent hypothesis. 
 
[Rave] All ravens are black. 
 
[NoB] All non-black things are non-ravens. 
 
Very briefly: by SUPPORT, observation of a red pencil, say, being an observation of a non-
black non-raven, confirms hypothesis [NoB], and thus, by EQUIVALENCE, also confirms 
the logically equivalent hypothesis [Rave] that all ravens are black. It is at least prima facie 
paradoxical that a red pencil should come out positively supporting a hypothesis about 
ravens! 
 
Hempel bites the bullet, however, and endorses that conclusion. The reason we think it 
paradoxical, he claims, is that we mistakenly think that [Rave] is making a claim just about 
ravens; but the fact that [Rave] is equivalent to [NoB] shows that this is simply not so.
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Indeed, once we see that [Rave] is also equivalent to the hypothesis [Noth] that nothing is a 
non-black raven, we realize that [Rave] is in fact making a claim about every object in the 
world. Thus, even observations of black non-ravens, e.g. black shoes, come out confirming 
                                                 
1
 I suspect some readers will question the claim that [Rave] and [NoB] are logically equivalent—
surely the first is about ravens whereas the second is about non-black things? It may be easier to see 
the equivalence once one sees, what is indicated in the very next sentence of the main text, that each 
hypothesis entails and is entailed by the hypothesis [Noth] that nothing is a non-black raven. 
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[Rave]—by virtue of its being equivalent to [Noth]. In short, no observation is neutral (or 
irrelevant) to [Rave]—any observation will either support [Rave] or refute it! 
 
But, it is important to note that Hempel takes these conclusions to hold only in contexts 
where there is no further background knowledge or assumptions. He gives the following 
example to show how SUPPORT can be nullified by the presence of additional information. 
Suppose someone attempted to test the hypothesis [SodS]: ‗All sodium salts burn yellow‘, by 
checking whether a yellow flame was produced when a piece of pure ice was held to it. They 
observed that a yellow flame was not produced and presented this result as confirming the 
hypothesis, ‗Whatever does not burn yellow is no sodium salt‘, and then, by appeal to 
EQUIVALENCE, as confirming the original hypothesis, [SodS]. Hempel acknowledges that 
this would strike us as paradoxical. He notes that the situation is different if we had done the 
same test with an as yet unidentified substance, found that a yellow flame was not produced, 
and then, on subsequent analysis, found that the substance contained no sodium salt. In this 
case, we would take the result of the test to confirm [SodS], even if it had turned out that the 
substance was pure ice. What gives? Here is Hempel‘s answer: 
 
Now the only difference between the two situations here considered is that in the first case we 
are told beforehand the test substance is ice, and we happen to ―know anyhow‖ that ice 
contains no sodium salt; this has the consequence that the outcome of the flame-colour test 
becomes entirely irrelevant for the confirmation of the hypothesis and thus can yield no new 
evidence for us. (Hempel 1945, p. 19). 
 
Thus, Hempel appears to hold that background information can render observation irrelevant 
to a hypothesis even though the same observation in the absence of that background 
information would confirm that hypothesis. So e.g. the view that the observation of a red 
pencil confirms [Rave] only seems paradoxical, on this view, because we already know that it 
is a red pencil, and so, not a raven; if we knew merely that the observed object was a non-
black non-raven, then the observation would indeed confirm [Rave] by way of confirming 
[NoB]. 
 
Here are three further examples which show that SUPPORT is vulnerable to background 
knowledge.  
 
Example 1. Suppose we come across a white crow in the arctic. According to SUPPORT, that 
observation, being an observation of a non-black non-raven, confirms [Rave]. But, since 
crows and ravens are biologically related species, this observation of a white crow surely 
renders it less likely, in other words, disconfirms, the hypothesis that all ravens are black—in 
which case, SUPPORT is violated.
2
 The background information which does the damage here 
is the relatedness of crows and ravens. 
 
Example 2 (from Good 1967). First, suppose we have come to the conclusion that one of the 
following two hypotheses about our world is true: 
 
(H1) The world contains a hundred black ravens, no non-black ravens, an a million 
other birds. 
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 Another casualty is the view that any observation will either confirm or refute a generalization: 
clearly, disconfirmation here is not to be understood as outright refutation. 
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(H2) The world contains a thousand black ravens, one white raven, and a million 
other birds. [So, on this hypothesis, not all ravens are black.] 
 
Now, suppose we are examining birds to see if [Rave] is correct and come across a black 
raven. This observation is more likely under hypothesis (H2) than hypothesis (H1), so the 
observation confirms (H2), on which [Rave] is false, and disconfirms (H1), on which [Rave] 
is true! Again, the example clearly relies on the presence of additional background 
information—whatever it is which renders (H1) and (H2) the only alternatives. 
 
Example 3 (from Sainsbury 1988). Consider the following generalization: 
 
 [Snake] All snakes inhabit countries other than Ireland. 
 
The more snakes we observe in other countries, thriving in a variety of environments, the less 
likely it is that there are no snakes in Ireland. Thus, a collection of observations of instances 
of [Snake] could disconfirm rather than confirm [Snake]! In this case it is the information we 
accrue, as we come across more and more instances, which eventually undermines 
SUPPORT. 
 
So, it is well known that background information may render SUPPORT invalid. But  
Hempel, and, along with him, many commentators, have generally taken the following, 
qualified version of SUPPORT to be untarnished by the sorts of examples we have 
considered: 
 
Qualified-SUPPORT (Q-SUPPORT) 
In the absence of further background information (beliefs, assumptions), a 
generalization is confirmed by observations of its instances.
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No doubt Q-SUPPORT is intuitively compelling at first blush; but, as we‘ll see, it is plain 
false! I will make my case by way of considering two other paradoxes of confirmation: 
Goodman‘s (1955) ‗grue‘ paradox and the so-called ‗tacking‘ or ‗irrelevnt conjunct‘paradox. 
What these paradoxes reveal, I will argue, is that it is in fact only in the presence of a 
background presumption of causal realism that observing an F to be G may support the 
generalization that all Fs are G. It is striking that leading figures writing on confirmation 
theory—Carnap, Hempel, Goodman, and Quine, for example—have, under the influence of 
logical positivism, simply denied that there is any mind-independent causal oomph (or 
necessitation) in the world: the regularities in the world are, for them, merely contingent and 
ungrounded; no events were ‗made to‘ happen; there is no underlying reason why things 
happen as they do. These philosophers accordingly failed to mention the realist blocking of 
the paradoxes I am going to present here. The central contention of this paper is that 
(inductive) confirmation in general rests on the presumption of causal realism, and that such 
a commitment to causal realism, albeit tacit and undefended, undermines the support 
principles underpinning the paradoxes of confirmation.  
The ‘grue’ paradox 
Goodman‘s (1955) ‗new riddle of induction‘ as he calls it arises from SUPPORT alone.4 Let 
‗grue‘ be a predicate that applies to anything that has been observed before now and found to 
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 The earlier qualification ‗so long as no counterinstances have been observed‘ is not needed, since 
any such observations would count as part of the background information. 
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be green, and to anything else, i.e. anything that has not been observed before now, just in 
case it is blue. Suppose that all emeralds that have been observed up until now have been 
green. By SUPPORT, these observations confirm the following hypothesis: 
 
 [Green] All emeralds are green. 
 
But, by the definition of ‗grue‘, it follows that the emeralds that have been observed up until 
now have also been grue. So, by SUPPORT, the same observations also confirm: 
 
 [Grue]  All emeralds are grue. 
 
The problem is, [Green] and [Grue] make divergent predictions about emeralds discovered 
in the future: the former predicts that they will be green, while the latter predicts that will be 
blue. We evidently favour the prediction that they will be green. But, Goodman asks, why 
‗project‘ the predicate ‗green‘ rather than the predicate ‗grue‘ here? 
 
He is good enough to provide an answer: it is simply because the predicate ‗green‘ is better 
entrenched in our language and theories than ‗grue‘. Goodman is offering us a psychological 
explanation of why we project ‗green‘ rather than ‗grue‘ here, but not a justification. Pace 
Hume, he does not think a justification is possible. 
 
I won‘t quibble with that answer now; the pertinent point here is that, for Goodman, it is the 
background information we have—to the effect that the predicate ‗green‘ is better 
entrenched than ‗grue‘—which tells in favour of [Green] over [Grue].5 
 
So, the ‗grue‘ paradox appears to give us yet more evidence of the impact of background 
information on the applicability of SUPPORT. But why should we take this fact to give any 
succour to Q-SUPPORT? One might just as well infer (what I in fact take to be the case) that 
background information is actually necessary for confirmation generally. Indeed, I think a 
cursory consideration of the tacking paradox reveals just this. 
The tacking (or irrelevant conjunct) paradox, and the obvious culprit 
This paradox arises from a cousin of SUPPORT and a principle concerning what we might 
call the ‗transmission‘ of confirmation: 
 
SUPPORT* 
A hypothesis is confirmed by observations of its consequences (or 
phenomena it predicts). 
                                                                                                                                                        
4
 A referee has pointed out important differences in the projects that Hempel and Goodman were 
engaged in: Hempel was concerned with the issue of specifying criteria for evaluating past 
performance whereas Goodman was concerned with the issue of grounding for future predictions. My 
concern here is with the second project; while Hempel may not have been addressing it, his 
observations certainly have implications for it—and that is how I am cashing out his paradox. In any 
case, the realist stance I press later applies to both projects, so the differences are immaterial for the 
purposes of this paper. (I thank the referee for forcing clarity on this point.) 
5
 Quine (1969) suggests restricting SUPPORT to generalizations involving natural-kind terms. This is 
along the lines of Goodman‘s proposal, for it is tantamount to holding that observations of FGs 
confirm All Fs are G conditional on background information to the effect that F and G are natural-
kind terms. 
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TRANS 
Observations which confirm a hypothesis, H, also confirm any hypothesis H 
entails. 
 
Now, let O be any true observation report, H be any hypothesis whatsoever consistent with 
O, and H* be the conjunction ‗O & H‘. By SUPPORT*, O confirms H*; but, in that case, by 
TRANS, O also confirms H, which is entailed by H*. So, we get the paradoxical result that 
any observation that has been made supports any hypothesis that is consistent with that 
observation. For example, the observation that I sneezed just now comes out confirming the 
hypothesis that the earth will explode tomorrow! 
 
This is the tacking paradox.
6
 The result is clearly absurd. However, it is easy to see what the 
source of the problem is. Obviously, our observation O confirms (in this case, entails) the 
first conjunct of H* (reminder: H* = 

O & H

), but it need have no bearing on the second 
conjunct whatsoever—for that conjunct may, as in our example, have just been ‗tacked‘ on. 
We need some independent reason for thinking that support for the first conjunct will be 
support for the second, or for thinking that the first conjunct itself supports the second. The 
air of paradox disappears even if we may not know what we should replace SUPPORT* or 
TRANS with. 
 
The ‘grue’ paradox is an instance of the tacking paradox 
Now, returning to Goodman‘s paradox, [Green] and [Grue] can be seen to be equivalent to 
the following conjunctions, respectively: 
 
 [&Green] 

All observed emeralds are green

 & 

All unobserved emeralds are 
green
 
 
 
 [&Grue] 

All observed emeralds are green

 & 

All unobserved emeralds are blue

 
 
Our evidence, that the emeralds we have observed so far have been green, clearly supports 
the first conjuncts of these hypotheses, but we are owed an answer as to why it should 
support the second conjuncts. This effectively boils down to the question of why the truth of 
the first conjunct should lead us to expect the second conjunct to be true. Therefore, 
Goodman‘s paradox is a simply an instance of the tacking paradox. 
 
Goodman is well aware of the foregoing point; he concurs that, in the absence of any other 
information, there is nothing to recommend [Green] over [Grue]. Without any background 
assumptions or information, we have the traditional problem of induction: there is nothing to 
recommend hypotheses about the unobserved on the basis of the observed! But, whereas 
Goodman settles for a Humean solution to his paradox—basically explaining why we favour 
[Green]—I contend that it is only a background presumption of causal realism, a belief that 
                                                 
6
 Hempel (1945, pp. 31-32) and Goodman (1955, pp. 67-68) are well aware of it, but do not draw the 
realist moral I am about to recommend. The problem is also discussed in connection with Popper‘s 
falsifiability principle—(if A is falsifiable/refutable, then so too is the conjunction [A & B], for any 
B)—and for Hypothetico-Deductive and Bayesian accounts of confirmation. See e.g. Fitelson (2002), 
Chandler (2007), Crupi and Tentori (2010), and Sprenger (2011) for elaboration of problems and 
attempted solutions. 
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there is mind-independent causal oomph (necessitation) in the world, which licences our 
inductive inferences. It is only the assumption that are objective reasons why observed 
objects have certain properties that entitle us to generalize. Thus, it is because, and only 
because, we have background information or beliefs to the effect that things like emeralds 
have properties in virtue of which they have the colour they do that observations of green 
emeralds confirm that all emeralds are green.
7
 
 
The upshot of all this is that causal realists—i.e. just about everyone but a few academic 
philosophers—should have no truck with Q-SUPPORT or with SUPPORT*. Not all 
generalizations will be confirmed by their instances, and not all hypotheses will be confirmed 
by their consequences: it is only in the presence of some background causal narrative that 
confirmation makes sense; thus, some regularities will count as merely accidental regularities 
and will perforce be unconfirmable. 
Humean causation vs Realist causation 
But why should realists about causation have an advantage over anti-realists? After all, the 
latter, Goodman among them, don‘t deny that there is causation8—it is their take on it which 
differs from the realists‘. There is no obstacle to their having the same causal beliefs—that is, 
beliefs about what causes what, or about which regularities are laws or lawlike—as the 
realists. So, assuming the same background causal beliefs, what counts as confirming 
evidence for a realist should also count as confirming evidence for an anti-realist. Where, 
then, is the advantage in realism? 
 
The advantage emerges when we consider the supposed direction of explanation between 
laws and their instantiations, if you will. For the realist, the laws are part of the explanation of 
why certain events occur or have the features they do; certain events make other events occur; 
events occur in virtue of other features of the world. Realists have good cause(!) then to take 
particular observations as data for establishing the (objective) causal structure of the world; 
as evidence of something that has a determinable impact beyond the observations which have 
been made so far. 
 
By contrast, while the anti-realist may well believe in the same laws or regularities, these 
don‘t explain why particular events occur—indeed, there is no explanation of why they occur. 
Rather, the laws themselves, as well as all other regularities, are partly determined (and 
explained) by what actually occurs. Thus, anti-realists do not have good cause to take 
particular observations as evidence of anything that impacts on other events! So, it strikes me 
that anti-realists are not entitled to, and by their own lights, should not make any assumptions 
about what universal regularities there, or, consequently, about what causes what.
9
 Moreover, 
even if they have made such assumptions—because they can‘t help it, as Hume suggests—
they should realize, precisely because of their views on the direction of explanation, that 
these assumption do not in any way support (or give any grounds for expecting) future events 
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 So, in my view Hume was right to insist that induction must be founded on the relation of cause and 
effect, but remiss in not recognizing that a realist conception of cause is required. 
8
 See Lewis (1973) for an influential and much discussed Humean account of causation. 
9
 The same goes for assumptions like: the Fs we have observed to be G are representative (are an 
unbiased sample) of Fs. The idea of ‗representative‘ or ‗biased‘ samples has no bite unless it is cashed 
out in realist terms; for the anti-realist, the above assumption is simply tantamount to the assumption 
that all Fs are G—which, as I have argued in the text, the anti-realist is not entitled to, indeed, ought 
not to, assume. 
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to conform to them. While the assumptions may logically entail that a future event with 
property F will also have property G, it is in fact irrational for them to take the assumptions 
as providing positive support for that eventuality.
10
 
 
Hence my view that it is only on the assumption of causal realism, of an objective causal 
structure in the world, that confirmation makes sense. 
The paradox of the ravens reconsidered 
In rejecting Q-SUPPORT, causal realists obviously pull the rug from under Hempel‘s 
intended paradox. But, one might think that the paradox re-emerges for realists who allow 
(quite plausibly) that one‘s background information is, or could well be, such that observing a 
given raven to be black does confirm [Rave]. For, presumably in those circumstances 
observing a non-black thing to be a non-raven, e.g. observing a red thing to be a pencil, will 
also confirm [NoB], and, thence, by EQUIVALENCE, [Rave]. But isn‘t that the very result 
we found paradoxical? 
 
But this worry is misguided. For the causal realist, when an observation of an FG confirms 
the hypothesis that All Fs are G it is never solely in virtue of the FG being an instance of the 
generalization. The confirmation will be relative to some cause-invoking background theory. 
The background theory on which [Rave] is confirmed by an instance therefore need not take 
observation of a red pencil to confirm [NoB] by virtue of it being an instance of [NoB]; and 
there is no reason to expect the observation of the pencil to confirm the kind of causal theory 
that underpins [Rave].  
 
The example of the white crow makes my point. The situation in which the white crow is 
observed may well be a situation in which observation of a black raven confirms [Rave]. But, 
as we have noted, the observation of the white crow still disconfirms [Rave], even though it is 
an instance of [NoB]. So, I deny that Hempel‘s paradox re-emerges for causal realists. 
 
Of course, the traditional problem of induction remains; Humean sceptics will want to know 
what warrants the background commitment to causal realism. I have not attempted to address 
that issue—though, if push came to shove, I would probably defend it by way of inference to 
the best explanation.
11
  However, my goal was not to resolve the problem of induction; rather, 
it was to remind causal realists that they need not be concerned with the paradoxes of 
confirmation. These paradoxes were supposed to pose harder problems than Hume‘s problem 
of induction—Goodman, for example, takes them to be quite distinct: he thinks Hempel 
avoids the tacking paradox but not the grue paradox. What I hope to have shown is that they 
are in effect one and the same paradox, each stemming from a version of SUPPORT that 
causal realists will deny.  
 
                                                 
10
 The claim here is that it is irrational for the causal anti-realists to take this line. Of course, ordinary 
folk who have not thought on such matters will do so out of ‗habit‘. Causal anti-realists, presumably, 
should know better and be able to break the habit! 
11
 I would also point out an absurd consequence of their stance. It is bad enough that, on their view, no 
events in the world have an explanation, a reason why they happened; but in the case of perception, 
they are further led to posit chains of events in the world running in parallel with, and presumably 
matching, our visual experiences as of those events occurring. That the occurrence of such widespread 
‗matching‘ chains of events should be mere coincidence—as the anti-realist would have us believe—
strikes me, not to mince words, as quite ludicrous. 
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What is baffling is that this realist response should be entirely omitted in many discussions of 
the paradox, including major introductory texts—(to wit, check e.g Mackie 1963; Jackson 
1975; Sainsbury 1988; Bird 1998; Ladyman 2002; Bortolotti 2008; Vickers 2012; and the 
Wikipedia entry on the ‗Raven paradox‘).12 
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